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Transparency and Oversight 
of the Council’s Budget: 
Council executive powers 
Giacomo Benedetto, David Rinaldi and Hartmut Aden 
Abstract 
This briefing introduces the challenges that have been faced in delivering a discharge 
of the Council’s budget over the last decade, with particular regard to the Council’s 
executive activities. The authors analyse the institutional and legal constraints and 
put forward a number of recommendations aimed at achieving more accountability 
regarding the Council’s budget and executive expenditure without resorting to treaty 
reform. 
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Executive Summary 
For a number of years, the European Parliament and the Council have disagreed over the extent 
to which the Council’s expenditure should be examined by the Parliament in the annual 
budgetary discharge procedure.  
The current situation goes back to a period in which the Council had many fewer executive 
powers than it has today and in which many policies that are now financed by the EU budget 
were still intergovernmental and therefore paid by the Member States. In the 1990s, the 
Council’s expenditure for the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
Justice and Home Affairs was related to the intergovernmental structure that characterised the 
EU’s second and third pillars from the Treaty of Maastricht. At that time, the implementation 
of the relevant policies was mostly (co-)financed by the Member States. Only the pure 
administrative costs at Council level had to be covered by the EU budget. This has changed 
since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009. 
The research undertaken for this briefing has not produced evidence that might prove any 
misuse of administrative expenditure for implementation tasks by the Council. However, the 
Council’s administrative expenditure lacks transparency. As this expenditure only represents a 
small part of the total EU budget, the relevant expenditure has not been audited in detail by 
the European Court of Auditors (ECA) over the past few years. In 2015, only 6.2% of total EU 
expenditure was related to the administration of (all) EU institutions, and the Council and the 
European Council only used a small part of this (5.5% of total administrative expenditure, or 
€500 million). As the Council has only published very limited data on its own expenditure thus 
far, the lack of transparency can trigger mistrust. 
In the current framework, the separation between administrative expenditure and 
implementation costs – both financed from the EU budget – is not easy to manage and is 
of limited relevance. Part of the reasoning for the Council to defend its budgetary autonomy 
with only limited accountability in relation to the European Parliament in the annual 
discharge procedure is that the Council considers itself to be a legislature rather than an 
executive body. The role of the Council as co-legislator in the ordinary legislative procedure 
likely produces some of the administrative expenditure. Nevertheless, the Parliament’s 
hypothesis that the implementation of administrative tasks financed from the EU budget 
might also be covered by those parts of the budget for which the Council refuses 
parliamentary scrutiny seems plausible. 
The authors therefore recommend the following: 
1. The European Court of Auditors is independent to select the areas to be included in its 
regularity and performance audits. However, from the Parliament’s perspective, it would 
be most useful if the ECA provides a more thorough institution-specific annual audit of 
administrative expenditure, so that the Council can be properly monitored.  
2. The ECA might reconsider its internal organisation in order to increase its capacity to audit 
the Council’s use of the EU budget.  
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3. A new modus vivendi on discharge between the Parliament and Council, rather than a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’, could be considered. Alternatively, an inter-institutional 
agreement on discharge could be proposed. Such an agreement should have a sunset 
clause in case either institution prefers to abandon it in the future. This could follow the 
same time periods as the multiannual financial framework. Renewal of the inter-
institutional agreement for discharge would require consent of both the Council, by 
qualified majority, and the European Parliament. The agreement could respect the 
principles of the gentlemen’s agreement on Parliament and Council expenditure that is 
proven to be for legislative purposes. The Parliament would respond to Council queries 
on its expenditure for the preparation of the Council's recommendation. The Council 
would provide the same level of information for the discharge of its legislative activity by 
the Parliament. The agreement would specify the nature of access to financial documents 
concerned with executive policy in the Council.  
4. Section II of the EU budget could be divided. Section II could apply only to the Council’s 
legislative activities, while a new Section XI would cover the executive activities of the 
Council and the European Council, with separate discharges and levels of scrutiny 
applying to Sections II and XI. 
5. A better conceptualisation of the issues addressed in the questionnaires sent by 
Parliament to the institutions during the annual discharge procedure could function as ex 
ante guidelines.  
6. If the disagreement continues, the Parliament might consider further instruments such 
as parliamentary inquiries and the use of the powers of both its Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs and its Foreign Affairs Committees to investigate the spending side within 
their policy areas. 
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Transparency and Oversight of the Council’s Budget:  
Council executive powers 
Giacomo Benedetto, David Rinaldi and Hartmut Aden 
CEPS Research Report No. 2017/11, July 2017 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade the European Parliament has withheld approval or discharge of the annual 
accounts and management of the Council of the European Union and the European Council 
(collectively referred to as the Council hereafter), although it has approved discharge for the 
EU’s other institutions. Refusal of discharge is due to the Parliament’s claims that the Council 
has provided insufficient information. In particular, the Parliament is concerned about the use 
of Council funds for pursuing executive rather than legislative activity. 
The Council’s position is that as a legislature it should not be accountable to another legislature 
for its internal affairs. This position has an historic foundation that dates from the 1970 Treaty 
of Luxembourg. At that time, the Parliament and the Council expected to amend the European 
Commission’s executive budget but concluded an agreement that they would not amend each 
other’s budgets. For the Council, this still holds and applies to discharge. Nevertheless, the 
Council and the Parliament have discussed a modus vivendi in recent years to overcome the 
disagreement, although resolution proved to be elusive. 
1.1 Questionnaires and decisions of rejection 
The European Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee sends a questionnaire on 
performance and financial management to each EU institution on an annual basis, which it uses, 
along with reports that it receives from the European Court of Auditors (ECA), to determine the 
discharge.  
Table 1 illustrates a series of unanswered and often repeated questions posed by the 
Parliament. For the 2009 discharge, during the transition to the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), there was a series of questions on focused cost. The financing of EU Special 
Representatives had for years been contentious as the ECA had itself noted: “The question of 
defining administrative expenses compared to operational expenses has not been resolved. 
Although a budgetary line has been introduced since 1998…to cover preparatory expenses 
(previously considered as administrative), the Council decided that the expenses linked to the 
Special Representatives of the EU (EUSR) had to be from here on considered as administrative 
and, to that end, financed through the budget of the Council’s Secretariat-General” (Cour des 
Comptes, 2001: 6). 
The questionnaires after 2013 omitted specific reference to executive activities. 
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Table 1. Frequency of annual questions from the Parliament to the Council on executive tasks 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
How much co-financing with the Commission is there in external policy? X       X 
Number of staff posts for EU Special Representatives? X X     X 
Allocation of EUSR staff posts between Council and EEAS? X     X X 
For the High Representative, what is cost share between Council and Commission? X       X 
How did Council prepare its budget for the High Representative? X       X 
Expenditure in CFSP/CSDP for Council X       X 
Administrative expenditure for CSDP operations X       X 
Administration expenditure and number of posts for ATHENAE X       X 
How many staff still work in external actions?   X X X X 
Travel costs for EUSR staff   X     X 
Which CFSP/CSDP costs are now transferred to EEAS?     X   X 
Why was the creation of EEAS not taken into account in the 2011 budget?     X   X 
Please provide more details on the CFSP/CSDP in the Council     X   X 
How much of Council's budget is contributed to the EEAS?     X   X 
Please answer unanswered questions since 2010         X 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 2 illustrates the reasons why Parliament chose to reject discharge on an annual basis: an 
alleged lack of accountability and openness, the refusal of the Council to comply with the 
Parliament’s questionnaire (which all other institutions accepted), the Council failing to supply 
documentation, and, in later years, the Council failing to supply equalities data on its staff or to 
adopt whistleblowing and integrity/conflict of interest policies. Although none of the reasons 
includes a lack of response on executive matters, it can be implied from the demands for 
openness and indicators in matters like travel. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate considerable 
parliamentary dissatisfaction. 
Table 2. Reasons given in the Parliament’s annual resolutions to reject discharge to the Council 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Council should be scrutinised like all other institutions X X   X X X 
Council fails to meet CONT or rapporteur X           
EP opposes new inter-institutional agreement on discharge X           
Non-response by Council to questionnaire X X X X   X 
Lack of budgetary documentation X   X X X X 
Ramassage: Buildings   X X X X   
Procurement     X X     
Separate Council and European Council budgets     X       
Need for performance indicators in travel, logistics, interpretation     X       
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No Council reply to ECA report       X     
No analysis of demography of Council staff         X X 
No integrity rules           X 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
1.2 A way forward? 
Upon recognition of the political costs of non-agreement, informal contacts between the 
Council and the Parliament on the discharge started in 2010. After several exchanges of views, 
a proposal was received by the Secretary General of the European Parliament from the 
Secretary General of the Council, regarding organisation of relations between the two 
institutions on the respective budgets. Over the years that followed, the Council proposed that 
the Parliament make available to the Council the exact same set of documents and respond in 
writing to possible Council questions related to the remarks made by the ECA in its annual 
report, so that the Council could generate a recommendation for the Parliament’s own 
discharge. The Parliament did not accept this. New contacts between the two institutions tried 
to establish a modus vivendi to establish which documents were required by each institution in 
order to grant discharge. This resulted in a ‘non-paper’ prepared by the Rapporteur during the 
2010 discharge exercise. It was not accepted by the majority of the political groups in the 
Parliament and only a small part of it was inserted in the discharge report adopted in October 
2012.  
In 2013, during the 2011 discharge exercise, the Council drew attention to the fact that no reply 
had been received from Parliament to the approaches for resolution made by the Council. In 
the meantime, the Council continued not to provide replies to the Parliament’s annual 
questionnaires. Since then, inter-institutional contacts were resumed at the start of 2016 to 
focus on common interests and positions in finding a resolution. 
This indicates that, despite very real disagreement on respective institutional roles, the 
Parliament and Council are keen to conclude cooperation on managing the discharge process. 
This briefing covers the complexity of those issues. The second section analyses the institutional 
powers over the budget and discharge that concern the Council. Part of the challenge is that, 
while the European Union has developed more responsibility since the Treaty of Luxembourg 
in 1970, it is the Council whose executive powers have been most enhanced and regularly 
changed. Its status and power mean that there is more to scrutinise than was in the 1970s 
when the discharge procedure was last modified. The third section provides a detailed analysis 
of the Council’s budget at present, which is officially administrative only. It also analyses areas 
of missing information where executive politics could be relevant. Finally, the conclusion 
summarises the discussion and recommends how to proceed without the need for treaty 
reform. 
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2. Council’s Powers 
2.1 Budgets and Institutional Powers  
The 1970 Treaty of Luxembourg introduced a number of important changes to the structure 
and rules of the then European Community’s budget. First, it introduced financing based on 
real own resources composed of an external tariff and a call for value added tax (VAT) to replace 
direct national contributions. Second, it allowed the European Parliament to impose 
amendments in the then 6% of expenditure that was deemed non-compulsory (Official Journal 
of the European Communities, 1971). Third, it led to a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the 
Council and the Parliament that neither of these two institutions would touch each other’s 
small administrative budgets. Fourth, the Council and Parliament would share a power to grant 
annual discharge to the Community’s budget. Previously, the Council alone exercised the power 
of discharge but had to communicate its decisions to the European Parliament (European 
Parliament, 2012: 16). 
A subsequent Treaty of Brussels came into effect in 1977. First, it provided the Parliament with 
powers of rejection over the whole budget. Second, it also replaced a Control Committee with 
the new ECA that had the status of a full institution. Member States were to nominate their 
respective members of the Court, giving indirect power to the Council, but subject to a 
consultative vote of the European Parliament. Third, Parliament gained the exclusive right of 
discharge subject only to a recommendation by the Council (European Parliament, 2012: 16). 
Later changes to the European Union’s Own Resources gave Member States represented in the 
Council full control of the financing of the budget. As the external tariff and VAT failed to 
provide sufficient funds, a decision to rely on a residual based on each Member State’s gross 
national income (GNI) in 1988 effectively reintroduced national contributions, and reinforced 
national sovereignty in the budget. The agreement on the UK rebate in 1984 had already sent 
the budget in the direction of national sovereignty considerations. The 1988 reform also 
allowed for multiannual spending programmes to be introduced subject to a unanimous 
agreement by the Member States and a vote of approval by the Parliament. 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty incorporates the multiannual budgeting process into the treaty as 
Article 312, and makes changes to the rules for the annual budget in Articles 314-5. These rules 
unify the procedure for compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. An annual budget now 
must obtain the consent of both the Council and the Parliament in order to pass. If it does not 
pass, the previous year’s budget may roll over, in which case only the Council may vary its 
expenditure, while the Parliament is limited to preventing increases only (Benedetto, 2013, 
2017). 
Although the Parliament has some important powers over the budget, the Council has the 
upper hand. The Parliament’s role in agenda-setting and seeking accountability in the 
implementation of the budget has import through the post hoc power of the discharge. 
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2.2 Executive evolution of the Council  
In its responses to the Parliament on the question of discharge, the Council claims that it is a 
legislative institution and should not be accountable to another institution as to how it 
administers its internal expenditure. Professor Matthias Rossi shared this view in the evidence 
given during the 2012 workshop on the Council’s discharge (European Parliament, 2012). 
Further, the Council has cited the 1970 gentlemen’s agreement that exists between it and the 
Parliament and which requires mutual respect of each other’s budgets. 
However, the powers and responsibilities of the Council and the Parliament have developed 
significantly since 1970. The 1970 Treaty and the gentlemen’s agreement took effect in a 
European Community with limited competences, where the Council exercised a legislative role. 
Institutional meetings of the European Council were not held regularly, and the Community 
had no formal role in foreign, security, justice or home affairs policies. The Council was 
therefore unable to operate any executive policies. Although informally the Community 
developed a foreign relations policy and cooperation on police matters through the Trevi Group 
after 1975, it was not until the Treaty on European Union took effect in 1993 that there was 
competence in these areas. 
The 1999 Amsterdam Treaty further increased the executive competences of the Council. It 
established the office of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and the Schengen Secretariat, both within the Council. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty allowed for 
the creation of the European External Action Service outside the Council and the transfer of 
personnel and the High Representative to the new institution with a separate budget in Section 
X. This loss of some executive competence was replaced by new competence in the office of 
the President of the European Council and increased EU powers in police and judicial 
cooperation and in counterterrorism, coordinated by the Council’s administration.   
All of this explains why executive policy responsibility on the part of the Council has become 
controversial since 1993, meaning that the Council is no longer purely a legislative institution.  
2.3 Description of Discharge Procedure for the Council and the legal base 
While the Council has been reluctant to release its financial documents to the Parliament and 
to respond to queries in all policy areas, Parliament is particularly concerned about the use of 
Council finances for executive activities in foreign policy and justice and internal affairs. This is 
mixed up with a Council practice of not cooperating with the Parliament’s discharge enquiries. 
The legal opinion offered at the previous workshop on the granting of parliamentary discharge 
to the Council (European Parliament, 2012) was divided on the question of the Council’s 
obligation to comply with the Parliament’s questions. Favouring Parliament’s right to access 
Council documentation and to grant or refuse a discharge to the Council, Florence Chaltiel 
emphasised that Council is not one-half of a legislature (European Parliament, 2012: 21) but is 
also an executive. Parliaments should have democratic control over executives. For this reason, 
the 1970 gentlemen’s agreement not to touch each other’s budget is not valid with regard to 
the Council’s executive expenditure or to discharge (De Feo, 2017). 
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The primary law of the European Union is the Lisbon Treaty – the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European (TFEU) – which does not prohibit parliamentary discharge to institutions other 
than the Commission. Article 287.3(2) assumes that the Council and other institutions will 
forward information to the ECA, while Article 316(3) requires the expenditure of different 
institutions to be set out in different parts of budget. Although Article 317(1) declares that the 
Commission implements the budget with the Member States “on its own responsibility”, the 
next paragraph specifies that regulations may assign responsibilities to each institution. It 
follows that there may be a logic for a discharge to each institution whether or not it exercises 
legislative or executive powers. However, Article 319(1) refers to the granting of a discharge to 
the Commission, not to the other institutions. Carlino Antpöhler noted this ambiguity in the 
2012 workshop: “Under the legislation, Parliament grants discharge to the Commission for the 
entire budget. There is no explicit provision on the discharge to the Council. Whether that rules 
out a separate discharge to the Council is not specified. The legislation does not say that 
Parliament only grants to the Commission” (European Parliament, 2012: 23). 
Concerning the Financial Regulation (2012: Article 162), the ECA annual report refers to each 
institution which will have supplied documentation. Parliamentary discharge is decided on the 
basis of that annual report. The Council has consented to the Financial Regulation under the 
ordinary legislative procedure on the basis of Article 322.1(a) TFEU, suggesting that the 
Parliament has the right to consider discharge to the Council. 
Box 1. Description of the discharge procedure 
The procedure for the discharge is clear from the Financial Regulation (2012) and the 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. In Financial Regulation Article 161.1(1), all institutions of the 
EU, including the Council, provide access to the ECA, whose annual report contains a section for 
each institution (Article 162.3), to which those concerned may respond prior to publication. The 
ECA communicates any reasons that may justify the launching of a special report to the 
institutions concerned. Article 166 (Financial Regulation, 2012) requires EU institutions (not just 
the Commission) to cooperate with the discharge process. In terms of timetable, the discharge 
is granted by the month of May, 17 months after the end of the financial year in question, based 
on a recommendation by the Council (Financial Regulation, 2012: Article 164.1), though delays 
are possible, in which case the Commission facilitates access to information.  
The European Parliament has set its own agendas for discharge via Rules 93-94 and Annex IV in 
its Rules of Procedure. Article 94 assumes a separate discharge for each institution. Annex IV lists 
the stages in the procedure. The Parliament’s budgetary control committee will consider the 
balance sheets presented by the European Commission, the reports by the ECA and responses 
from each institution, and the recommendation of the Council. Parliament will decide on 
discharge by the end of April, which is 16 months after the end of the respective financial year. 
Parliament may grant discharge and closure of the accounts, or it may delay, in either case 
inserting its comments on future implementation of expenditure. If it chooses to delay, it will 
state the reasons for doing so and specify other documents it expects to see. If there is a delay, 
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the discharge is reconsidered within six months, when it will be either granted or refused, with 
reasons. Concerning the discharge for the Commission and for EU agencies, if these are refused, 
the accounts will be closed at a later session when the Commission will give a statement. 
2.4 Remaining challenges  
The rules on discharge set out in Article 319 TFEU require that the Council makes a 
recommendation before the European Parliament decides. The Council does this only with 
regard to the discharges for the Commission and the EU agencies that are financed through the 
Commission’s budget (Section III). The Council resists accounting to the Parliament for its 
expenditure on the grounds of the gentlemen’s agreement of 1970 not to interfere with each 
other’s budgets and the notion of reciprocity between these two notionally legislative 
institutions. In previous discussions, the Council had raised the idea of examining the 
Parliament’s accounts more carefully as a precondition for releasing its own documentation to 
the Parliament. Interviews with members of the Parliament revealed that the Council had never 
specified which parliamentary documents it sought, and that the Council had never made any 
recommendation for the discharges to institutions other than the Commission. 
The view of some parliamentary respondents is that this type of reciprocity may be possible if 
the Council specifies what it wants and engages in the formulation of recommendations as part 
of the discharge process. The Parliament’s preferred model for discharge to the Council is the 
reality that exists between it and other institutions, e.g. the Court of Justice or the Committee 
of the Regions, which respond to parliamentary questionnaires and queries, and for which the 
Parliament grants discharges. 
3. Council’s Budget 
Over time, the share of the EU budget for the administration of the Union has remained rather 
stable, at around 6%. In recent years, the peak was in 2010 and 2011 at 6.5%. For 2015, when 
the budget for heading 5 on administration was 6.2% of the annual budget, the total 
commitments amounted to €9.2 billion. About €500 million per year cover the administration 
of the European Council and the Council. As highlighted in Figure 1, with respect to EU spending 
for administration, the combined weight of the European Council and Council is about 5.5%. 
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Figure 1. The 2015 budget for administration, by institution  
 
Source: ECA (2016). Note: The ECA mandate does not include financial audit to the ECB, and EU 
agencies are reported separately. “Others” includes the Committee of the Regions (CoR), the 
European Ombudsman and the European Data Protection Supervisor.     
 
The management of the Council’s administrative expenditure is a responsibility of the 
Secretary-General of the Council, who, as delegated authorising officer, ensures budget 
implementation on behalf of both the Council and the European Council. Regarding the annual 
budget, current practice does not foresee a distinction of the respective costs of each 
institution and administrative costs are accounted for indistinctively.  
Another missing distinction is that between expenditure related to the legislative and executive 
functions. As stressed by Chaltiel (2012) and Antpöhler (2012), the debate on the discharge 
should take into account that the Council has taken up substantial executive powers. 
Distinguishing between expenses linked to the Council’s legislative and executive functions 
would be of particular relevance given that the 1970 gentlemen’s agreement should not apply 
to the latter. Parliamentary oversight of the executive is a general well-established practice that 
ensures democratic legitimacy.     
The distinction between administrative expenditure and expenditure for implementation goes 
back to the EU’s pillar architecture in the 1990s, when the expenditure for the implementation 
of second- and third-pillar policies had to be carried in principle by the Member States. Already 
at that time, this distinction revealed itself to be practically difficult to handle (cf. Monar, 1997, 
for a critique). Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the necessity of this distinction seems even more 
questionable. 
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The ECA scrutinises the budget by policy area or heading, e.g. administrative expenditure in the 
whole budget (heading 5) is examined by Chamber V, external actions, justice and home affairs 
(headings 3 and 4) are examined by Chamber III.  
The discharge, however, is granted for each institution and not to policies or headings. This is 
a fundamental mismatch that needs to be addressed. A restructuring of Chamber V to examine 
only Commission administration could be considered, while a new Chamber VI could examine 
administrative expenditure in all other institutions. This would be in line not only with how the 
discharges but also the annual budgets work, the latter of which in the European Parliament 
have two rapporteurs: one for the Commission (Section III) and the other for all other 
institutions. 
Box 2. Council allocated budget for 2017  
€561.6 million budgeted for 2017.  
 8.6% for IT systems, equipment and furniture  
 10.3% for buildings and infrastructure  
 18.3% on direct costs relating to official meetings, including interpreting and 
travel 
 59.8% for over 3,000 staff members  
Source: Council website. 
3.1 Administrative expenditure  
On paper, the discharge by the Parliament should be confined to the Council’s executive activity 
(Antpöhler, 2012); but drawing a line between what is executive and what is legislative 
expenditure is not an easy task. To accommodate this, the planning, accounting and monitoring 
of the Council’s budget should change substantially.  
As the powers of the Council increased in areas of foreign policy and security, the Parliament 
feared that to a certain extent some expenditure connected to executive initiatives could end 
up misreported as administrative expenditure, de facto bypassing oversight and proper 
accountability.  
As shown in Box 1 and Table 3, Section II of the budget accounting for Council expenditure only 
includes administrative expenditure; in other words, there is no evidence of misreporting. 
Moreover, ECA officials have confirmed that no funds under Section II contribute to mixed 
financing in the external sphere. Nonetheless, the crucial matter here is not whether such 
expenses are ‘administrative’, as they actually are, but whether such administrative costs are 
incurred to support the Council’s legislative or executive activities.  
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Table 3. Administrative expenditure of the Council and European Council, 2016 
 
€  %  
Persons working for the Institutions 323,302,000 59% 
 
Members 
 
1,302,000 0.24% 
 
Officials and temporary staff 299,452,000 55% 
 
Other staff and outsourced services 13,306,000 2.44% 
 
Other expenditure related to persons 9,242,000 1.7% 
  
Mission expenses of the Sec-Gen 2,980,000 0.55% 
  
Travel expenses of staff related to European 
Council 600,000 0.11% 
Buildings, equipment and operating costs 219,752,000 40% 
 
Buildings and associated costs 55,768,000 10% 
 
ICT and furniture 46,204,000 8% 
 
Operating expenditure 117,780,000 22% 
  
Travel 18,267,000 3.35% 
  
Interpreting 82,739,000 15.18% 
  
Internal meetings 5,462,000 1% 
  
Other meetings and conferences  275,000 0.05% 
Other Expenditure 
 
2,000,000 0.37% 
TOTAL 
  
545,054,000 100% 
Source: 2016 ECA Annual Report. 
 
For certain types of expenditure, such as buildings and associated costs, or ICT and furniture, 
determining which shares of the expense should be charged to executive and legislative affairs, 
respectively might prove problematic, but by means of proper guidelines and methodology, it 
should be feasible. For other headings – meetings, interpreting, salaries, travels – the 
identification of the objective of the action should be rather straightforward and it is rather a 
matter of implementation.  
At first glance it may seem that discerning whether a meeting plays a legislative or executive 
function is rather redundant given the slight weight of meetings in the total budget: 1.05% of 
total administrative costs and 4.2% of the operating costs (see Figure 2). Nonetheless, 
identifying whether a meeting targets one or the other objective also determines the allocation 
of interpreting costs, which amount to over €80 million a year, or over 15% of the total budget, 
and 75% of the operating costs.  
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Figure 2. Council’s operating expenditure  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on European Commission data. Note: In terms of share 
of operating expenditures, cross-year variability is not substantial. The figure reports 
averages for 2012-16 appropriations.     
 
As presented in Box 3, among the administrative costs reported in Section II are expenses 
incurred for meetings vast in number and wide-ranging in type. The EU-CELAC Summit, with 61 
participating delegations, and the Valletta Summit on migration, with 87 participating 
delegations, are among the meetings under consideration. It is ascertained that their 
circumstances involved perhaps more executive powers than strictly legislative ones. Protocol 
events and Coreper II on foreign policy may also involve core executive competencies.  
Box 3. Meeting at the Council, 2015  
5,973 meetings organised by the Directorate for Conferences and Protocol (DGA 2A)   
 8 European summits  
 3 Euro summits 
 1 multilateral summit in Brussels, the EU-Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (EU-CELAC) 
 20 Eurogroup meetings 
 78 Council meetings (or equivalent) 
 138 Coreper meetings 
 3,471 working party meetings 
 Over 1,300 other protocol events 
Source: Council (2016). 
Travel costs, 
16.7%
Interpreting, 
75.1%
Internal 
meetings, 
3.4%
Other 
meetings, 
0.8%
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Technically, this would also imply that a share of the time of DGA 2A staff members who actually 
set and organise the meetings also has to be accounted for as executive-related and therefore 
should be included in discharge. Council (2016a) further explains that the Directorate for 
Building and Logistics (DGA 2B) was also involved in such high-level summits and that it 
“provided significant logistical services” but does not translate the level of significance into a 
monetary value.  
3.2 Missing information     
The chief means to control and monitor the Council’s spending is the ECA Annual Report on the 
implementation of the EU budget. Chapter 9 presents the results of an audit on the whole EU 
administrative budget. The report’s main aim is to provide a statement of assurance on the 
reliability of the consolidated accounts of the EU. The report focuses on the legality and 
regularity of transactions and does not address matters of performance-based budgeting 
concerning administrative expenditure. It verifies the application of financial regulations and 
the principles of the EU budget but does not check the efficiency and effectiveness of 
administrative expenditure.   
For several reasons, administrative spending receives limited attention: i) it is marginal in size 
with respect to other headings; ii) within the MFF, it is generally considered to be a low-risk 
area; and iii) institutional deference motivated by a desire to avoid inter-institutional frictions.  
Whether it is understandable that priority is given to auditing other headings, there are ample 
margins to provide more thorough and systematic revision of administrative budgets. An ECA 
audit is based on two main methodologies:  
 Sampling transactions: The control is performed on a representative sample of 
transactions, and the share of incorrect transactions is used to estimate the level of error. 
Regarding ‘administration’, the number of transactions directly audited is rather limited; 
Table 4 provides an account of the number of transactions controlled by the ECA in recent 
years for the annual report. Various types of transactions are included: payments of 
salaries and pensions, staff allowances, other staff costs, payments for buildings, and 
often recruitment and procurement procedures.    
 A rotational approach, applied since 2012 and completed only in 2015, consisting of a 
systems audit that covers two or three institutions per year. That implies that the Council 
was subject to the analysis in 2012, whilst its transactions have not been audited during 
subsequent years.1  
                                                     
1 Via the rotational approach, the Commission and the EJC were audited in 2013; the EESC, CoR and the European Ombudsman 
in 2014; and the EEAS and the European Data Protection Supervisor in 2015. Due to the rotational approach, there is no direct 
follow up or monitoring of the implementation of the 2012 recommendation to the Council (ECA, 2016: 287). 
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Table 4. Sample transactions and administrative spending audit results 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Number of 
transactions 
audited 
58 56 151 153 129 151 
Share of 
transactions 
with error 
7% 7% 1% 10% 15.5% 14.6% 
Error Rate 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 1.1% 0.5% 0.6% 
Source: 2012-15 ECA Annual Reports.  
Notably, the simultaneous exercise of these two audit methodologies – designed to audit 
administrative expenditure as a whole – can hardly provide a good framework for control 
systems of administrative expenditure of a single institution.  
As a consequence, if there is no specific concern raised by the ECA with respect to the Council’s 
administrative spending, it does not necessarily mean that the budgetary procedure has been 
respected. Rather, there may not be enough elements to properly assess respect of regulations.  
Interestingly, when the ECA Annual Report addressed the Council directly, that is, for 2011 and 
2012, it did find some – although little – evidence of irregularities in procurement procedures. 
For 2012, the audit of the European Council and the Council was performed on 15 recruitment 
procedures – none of which was found erroneous – and 15 procurement procedures, some of 
which were affected by errors underpinning the ECA’s recommendation to the Council on 
enhancing the design, coordination and performance of procurement procedures.2 For 2011, 
only five procurement procedures were audited, two of which did not comply with guidelines 
and regulation (see ECA, 2012: 211). 
As mentioned, on top of the limited size of the audit exercise, its scope is inadequate to ensure 
the transparency, effectiveness and efficiency of the Council’s administrative spending, 
because:  
 it is not in the mandate of the ECA to distinguish administrative expenditure that serves 
legislative purposes vis-à-vis executive purposes, or to distinguish administratively 
between the European Council and Council; 
 the audit does not systematically consider the value-for-money provided by the 
administrative budget, whether by the Council or any other institution. The annual report 
                                                     
2 Recommendation 2 (European Council and Council): Procurement, “The Council should ensure that authorising officers 
improve the design, coordination and performance of procurement procedures through appropriate checks and better 
guidance” (ECA, 2013). 
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remains based on the regularity of transactions, de facto avoiding establishing any link 
between the budget and (expected) results.  
In other words, the ECA’s annual audit of the Council’s expenses, in the framework of all EU 
administrative expenditure, can only in part, i.e. in some years, be useful for assessing 
accounting procedures but is of very little use in managing the administrative budget.  
One key example is the financing of the ‘Residence Palace’ building, which raised questions in 
the audit review (see ECA, 2011: 196) due to the abundant employment of the “ramassage”, 
i.e. an accounting technique that can generate advance payments, made available by budget 
transfers. A practice that due to the reallocation of budget is subject to the approval of the 
budget authority, even though the evidence is clear that it allows for a lower cost of capital, i.e. 
it is an effective management practice that can be considered an incorrect accounting 
procedure. The opposite instance, correct accounting procedures leading to mismanagement, 
might also be possible, and even though there is no evidence for this at the moment, the annual 
audit procedure is simply not capable of controlling for it. As a matter of fact, the ‘errors’ 
pointed out via audit in the annual reports mainly relate to i) payments not covered by 
contracts or agreements, ii) ineligible or incorrectly calculated staff allowances or benefits, and 
iii) other expenses without justification.  
At times, “Special Reports” close this gap and address specific issues of performance-based 
budgeting linked to administrative expenditure, often with a cross-institutional approach. That 
is the case, for instance, of a Special Report on facilitating procurement (ECA, 2016b), and 
another on diminishing greenhouse gas emissions in EU institutions (ECA, 2014b). Out of the 
36 Special Reports for 2016, only three included an analysis encompassing the performance 
and transparency of administrative spending.3   
A brief analysis of these Special Reports, interviews and the revision of the questionnaires 
addressed by the Parliament to the Council from 2010 onward highlight areas on which 
additional information could bring transparency and allow for an evaluation of value for money 
in the Council’s administrative spending. We can sum it up as follows:  
 Methodologies, consistency and commitment for internal audit  
ECA analyses of the administration of EU bodies and institutions, as well as European 
Parliament questionnaires submitted to the Council, attribute great relevance to setting up 
first-rate internal control systems. An overhauling audit, financial management and control are 
the basis for efficient use of resources, strengthened accountability for the stewardship of 
resources, and improved organisational leadership, management and oversight (see CIPFA, 
2014: 6). A sound internal audit procedure should ensure financial management and control 
and check its consistency with best practice and the needs of the institution.  
                                                     
3 On top of ECA (2016b), a Special Report addressed the buildings of the EEAS outside the EU (ECA, 2016c) and a third, more 
general one addressed the Commission’s governance and internal audit practices (ECA, 2016d).  
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The Council’s annual activity report covering 2015 (Council, 2016a, 2016b) was a step in this 
direction; if such an exercise is repeated consistently over time and strengthened in its 
methods, it has the potential to ensure a transparent approach to internal audits. The 
Parliament noted on more than one occasion that the frequent changes in format and practices 
undermine internal audit’s validity. In 2015, the Council implemented new arrangements aimed 
at introducing new Multiannual Activity and Budget Planning, setting up a Project Evaluation 
Committee, and revising the Internal Rules on Finance and Procurement; the activity report for 
2016 will perhaps clarify whether such changes delivered the expected results or further 
adaptations will be needed. Particularly in the absence of a well-established practice of internal 
auditing, which appears to be still in the making, an external audit may prove useful.      
 Operational expenditure for foreign policy actions  
As highlighted in the previous session, there is, at the moment, no distinction between 
administrative expenditure incurred during legislative or executive functions. Lack of 
information on foreign and security policy activity in the Council lies at the core of the 
Parliament’s concerns as expressed by the questionnaires in Table 1.  The 2015 annual activity 
report of the Council (2016a) also alluded to some grey areas of administrative expenditure in 
foreign actions, with respect to both translation services4 and travel costs5. The questionnaires 
by the Parliament are primarily concerned on understanding which share of Council’s staff (and 
budget) is assigned to foreign policy issues, with specific reference to the European Union 
Special Representatives and the working groups in the field of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy.  
According to the ECA (2014a: 25), “the EEAS should propose to the Council a review of the 
existing framework applicable to the EU special representatives to ensure their smooth 
integration with the work of the EEAS, including clarifying the conditions for their appointment, 
the characteristics of their mandate, the mechanisms to evaluate their performance, and 
proposing changes to their administrative position including staffing and financial aspects.” 
A related matters pertains to administrative expenditure in support of military operations. 
Council (2016a) also points out that the Directorate for Finance (DGA 4) manages the Athena 
mechanism, thus “ensuring the proper financing and support of six EU military operations”.   
Lastly, Council (2016a) stresses that some “budget lines with low outturn rates reflect the 
difficulty of budgeting accurately for high-level events, including multilateral summits”. This 
                                                     
4 “Supplementary services for the translation service with 200.000 euro appropriation in 2016 and same for 2017 covers 
expenditure related to translation services provided by external translation agencies to absorb the occasional excessive 
workload of the Council Language Service, on the one hand, and to verify the translations of agreements, treaties and other 
arrangements with third countries in non-EU languages, on the other hand. This appropriation is also intended to cover the 
Council's development projects in the field of translation.” (Council, 2016a)  
5 “Miscellaneous travel expenses, appropriation is intended to cover travel and subsistence allowances for experts invited to 
meetings or sent on mission by the Secretary-General of the Council or by the President of the European Council.” (Council, 
2016a) 
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may be due to the difficulty of mixed/joint financing within Member States; for relevant 
summits, certain expenditures are covered by national treasuries, in accordance with the ‘costs 
lie where they fall’ principle (Sanchez-Barrueco & Stephenson, 2017).  
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1 Concluding remarks 
Disagreement over the right of the European Parliament to examine the Council’s documents 
and to grant a discharge to the Council has affected inter-institutional relations over the last 
decade. Reasons that are both political and legal explain the origins of this disruption. At the 
time of a very different European Community in the 1970s, the Parliament and the Council 
agreed not to interfere with each other’s budgets, both of which were intended to fund the 
administration of law-making institutions rather than of executives. Since then, the European 
Union has acquired substantial powers that have led to an increase in law-making capacity for 
the Parliament and the Council, and the introduction of executive responsibilities for the 
Council. 
Part of the reasoning for the Council to defend its budgetary autonomy – including with regards 
to scrutiny – is that the Council considers itself to be a legislature rather than an executive, a 
notion challenged by the Parliament. As one respondent in the European Parliament remarked, 
in a Member State it would be unthinkable for a parliament not to be empowered to scrutinise 
the expenditure of the government, and the Council shares ‘government’ powers with the 
Commission. Yet the Council also cites security concerns reserved for heads of state and 
government (an executive rationale) for evading scrutiny.  
For its annual reports, the ECA scrutinises about 150 randomly selected transactions involving 
administrative expenditure incurred by EU institutions. This sampling methodology, together 
with the rotational approach and the relatively low weight of the Council’s administrative 
accounts (about 6% of administration expenditure), means that the ECA annual scrutiny of the 
Council’s administrative transactions is extremely limited. As such scrutiny is also uniquely 
focused on the respect of legal requirements and is unlikely to detect direct executive usage 
for such expenditure. In addition, files concerned with, for example, the salaries of Council 
employees are unlikely to distinguish those working in purely legislative fields from those 
whose work has a more executive orientation. The ECA nevertheless has the autonomy to 
launch special ad hoc reports, for example on all EU budgetary spending in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, for which scrutiny may extend to Council files. 
There is also an asymmetry in how the budget is determined and then discharged. The annual 
budget allocates funds to policy areas and to institutions. Nearly all of the budgets for 
institutions outside the Commission and the European External Action Service are 
administrative but share the administrative heading with the costs of the Commission’s internal 
administration. In the European Parliament, one rapporteur is responsible for Commission 
expenditure – including nearly all the non-administrative expenditure – and another rapporteur 
TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT OF THE COUNCIL’S BUDGET: COUNCIL EXECUTIVE POWERS | 17 
 
is responsible for all other institutions. When considering the accounts, the ECA, however, is 
divided into chambers, which investigate expenditure not by institution but by policy, including 
the multi-institutional policy of administration. Finally, the Parliament decides on the discharge 
on the basis of institutions and not policies.  
4.2 Recommendations  
The following recommendations apply to each institution, while respecting the operational 
autonomy of the Court of Auditors (ECA) in particular. 
The Court of Auditors 
1. The ECA could provide a more thorough institution-specific annual audit of administrative 
expenditure, so that the Council can be properly monitored. As the Council spends 6% of 
the EU’s total administrative budget, the Council files that the ECA audits make up only 
6% of the total. 
2. Chamber V (Financing and Administering the Union) in the ECA could be divided. One part 
would scrutinise the administrative expenditure of the European Commission and the 
other part would focus on the expenditure of the other EU institutions, thus increasing 
the breadth of the audit of the Council. This would resolve the mismatch whereby the 
discharge is granted for institutions and not for policy areas or headings, while the ECA 
examines only expenditure by policy area. This would be an operational decision taken 
by the ECA in compliance with its own autonomy. 
3. Chamber III (External Action, Security and Justice) of the ECA could explicitly audit Council 
files that may pertain to external actions. 
4. The ECA could audit administrative expenditure systematically in its Special Reports so 
that performance budgeting is ensured with specific respect to buildings.   
5. The ECA could launch a Special Report into the Council due to its multiple formations 
(Council of the EU, Coreper I and II, special committees, European Council), tasks, and 
changes to those tasks and formations in recent years. 
Parliament-Council relations 
1. A new modus vivendi on discharge between the Parliament and Council rather than a 
gentlemen’s agreement could be considered.  
2. Alternatively, an inter-institutional agreement on discharge could be proposed. Such an 
agreement should have a sunset clause in case either institution prefers to abandon it in 
the future. This could cover the same time periods as the multiannual financial 
framework. Renewal of the inter-institutional agreement for discharge would require 
consent of both the Council, by qualified majority, and the European Parliament. The 
agreement could respect the principles of the gentlemen’s agreement on Parliament and 
Council expenditure that is proven to be for legislative purposes. The Parliament would 
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respond to Council queries on its expenditure for the preparation of the Council's 
recommendation. The Council would provide the same level of information for the 
discharge of its legislative activity by the Parliament. The agreement would specify the 
nature of access to financial documents concerned with executive policy in the Council.  
Internal to the Council 
Section II of the EU budget could be divided. Section II could apply only to the Council’s 
legislative activities, while a new Section XI would cover the executive activities of the Council 
and the European Council, with separate discharges and levels of scrutiny applying to each of 
Sections II and XI. This would be more accountable but entail a division of the Council’s core 
administration that Carlino Antpöhler defined as impractical (European Parliament, 2012: 26). 
While meetings that occur in public are easy to define as legislative, matters are less simple 
when it comes to employees or buildings, unless their time or use can be apportioned to 
legislative or executive activity. 
A simpler alternative would be for all administrative expenditure to be categorised as legislative 
or executive. Employees, activities and buildings whose tasks fall into both categories would be 
assigned differing percentages of their formal time or use to each side.  
Internal to the European Parliament 
1. Better conceptualisation of the issues addressed in the questionnaires sent to the 
institutions for them to become ex ante guidelines.  
2. The Parliament could allow the Council oversight of Parliament expenditure for the 
purpose of a Recommendation only, which can be part of new modus vivendi or inter-
institutional agreement. 
3. An article could be inserted into Annex IV of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure that 
automatically requires a parliamentary rejection of discharge for any institution not 
presenting its accounts to the Parliament or not completing the Parliament’s 
questionnaire.  
What if disagreement continues? 
The Parliament has rejected discharge for the Council for every year since 2007. In the 
European Parliament (2012) workshop on discharge, Florence Chaltiel (2012: 93) concludes her 
contribution by outlining the strategies available to the Parliament if the inter-institutional 
conflict endures, and these remain valid: 
1. The Council argues, on the basis of Article 319 TFEU, that discharge should be granted 
for the entirety of the budget, which is implemented only by the Commission. This being 
the case, the Parliament could use the vote of investiture in the Commission as a tool 
to obtain missing expenditure data from the Council. 
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2. For the same reason, although an extreme option, the Parliament has the power to pass 
censure of the Commission. 
3. In plenary, parliamentarians can pose questions concerning the Council budget to the 
Commission, the Presidency the European Council and the Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union. 
4. The European Parliament has the power to establish committees of enquiry, and could 
establish one on inter-institutional relations and financial accountability. 
Besides the proposals of Chaltiel (2012), the Parliament could use the powers of its Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and its Foreign Affairs Committees to investigate the 
spending side within their policy areas. In addition, the Parliament also has the power of 
amendment over the annual budget to reduce expenditure in executive areas of foreign, 
security and internal policy where it believes the Council may be misusing administrative 
expenditure. 
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Table 5. Council’s expenditure – Section II, in € 
 
Budget Appropriations 
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
      
Persons working for the Institutions 340,324,000 323,302,000 321,768,000 316,207,539 323,802,000 318,287,000 
 
Members 1,322,000 1,302,000 1,392,000 1,230,000 1,138,000 1,454,000 
 
Officials and temporary staff 315,446,000 299,452,000 297,827,000 292,989,059 300,244,000 295,792,000 
 
Other staff and outsourced services 14,149,000 13,306,000 13,144,000 13,039,000 13,763,000 11,801,000 
 
Other expenditure related to persons 9,407,000 9,242,000 9,405,000 8,949,480 8,657,000 9,240,000 
  
Mission expenses of the Sec-Gen 2,980,000 2,980,000 3,165,000 3,191,000 3,191,000 3,216,000 
  
Travel expenses of staff related to European Council 650,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 
         
Buildings, equipment and operating costs 219,252,000 219,752,000 219,023,500 215,294,761 209,709,300 213,633,000 
 
Buildings and associated costs 57,789,000 55,768,000 52,207,500 46,237,800 44,933,000 43,503,000 
 
ICT and furniture 48,449,000 46,204,000 46,421,000 42,921,887 42,209,000 42,689,000 
 
Operating expenditure 113,014,000 117,780,000 120,395,000 126,835,074 122,567,300 127,441,000 
  
Delegation travel 18,272,000 18,267,000 18,206,000 20,758,000 20,417,000 25,095,000 
  
Interpreting 79,816,000 82,739,000 83,900,000 86,991,444 83,962,300 86,723,000 
  
Internal meetings 4,174,000 5,462,000 3,458,000 3,679,000 3,717,000 3,024,000 
  
Other meetings and conferences  190,000 275,000 511,000 1,588,010 1,320,000 800,000 
         
Other expenditure 2,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 2,700,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 
TOTAL 
 
561,576,000 545,054,000 541,791,500 534,202,300 535,511,300 533,920,000 
 Source: 2012-16 ECA Annual Reports.  
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Table 6. Council’s expenditure – Section II, % of annual budget  
  Budget APPROPIATIONS 
 
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
         
Persons working for the Institutions 61% 59% 59% 59% 60% 60% 
 
Members 0.24% 0.24% 0.26% 0.23% 0.21% 0.27% 
 
Officials and temporary staff 56% 55% 55% 55% 56% 55% 
 
Other staff and outsourced services 2.52% 2.44% 2.43% 2.44% 2.57% 2.21% 
 
Other expenditure related to persons 1.68% 1.70% 1.74% 1.68% 1.62% 1.73% 
  
Mission expenses of the Sec-Gen 0.53% 0.55% 0.58% 0.60% 0.60% 0.60% 
  
Travel expenses of staff related to European Council 0.12% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 
         
Buildings, equipment and operating costs 39% 40% 40% 40% 39% 40% 
 
Buildings and associated costs 10% 10% 10% 9% 8% 8% 
 
ICT and furniture 9% 8% 9% 8% 8% 8% 
 
Operating expenditure 20% 22% 22% 24% 23% 24% 
  
Delegation travel 3.25% 3.35% 3.36% 3.89% 3.81% 4.70% 
  
Interpreting 14.21% 15.18% 15.49% 16.28% 15.68% 16.24% 
  
Internal meetings 0.74% 1.00% 0.64% 0.69% 0.69% 0.57% 
  
Other meetings and conferences  0.03% 0.05% 0.09% 0.30% 0.25% 0.15% 
         
Other expenditure 0.36% 0.37% 0.18% 0.51% 0.37% 0.37% 
Source: 2012-16 ECA Annual Reports. 
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